Xi Jinping

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Xi Jinping
Xi in 2026
Xi Jinping
Born15 6, 1953
BirthplaceBeijing, China
NationalityChinese
OccupationTemplate:Ubl
Known forLeader of China since 2012, anti-corruption campaign, Belt and Road Initiative
EducationTsinghua University (BS, LLD)
Spouse(s)Template:Ubl
Children1

Xi Jinping (Template:IPA-zh; born 15 June 1953) is a Chinese politician and statesman who has served as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) since November 2012, and as President of the People's Republic of China since March 2013. As the holder of these three principal offices, Xi is considered the paramount leader of China and the central figure in the country's fifth generation of political leadership. Born in Beijing as the son of revolutionary veteran Xi Zhongxun, Xi experienced hardship as a teenager when his father was purged during the Cultural Revolution and he was sent to the countryside for manual labor. After joining the CCP in 1974 and graduating from Tsinghua University, he rose through the ranks of provincial politics, serving as governor of Fujian and later as party secretary of Zhejiang and Shanghai before ascending to the Politburo Standing Committee in 2007.[1] Since assuming power, Xi has overseen a sweeping anti-corruption campaign, pursued economic reforms centered on "common prosperity," implemented an assertive foreign policy, and championed the Belt and Road Initiative. He received the title of "leadership core" from the CCP in 2016, a designation that consolidated his authority within the party hierarchy.[2]

Early Life

Xi Jinping was born on 15 June 1953 in Beijing, the elder son of Xi Zhongxun's second marriage to Qi Xin.[3] His father was a veteran of the Chinese Red Army and a senior CCP official who had served as a vice premier and held other prominent government posts. Xi Zhongxun's revolutionary credentials placed the family within the ranks of China's so-called "red aristocracy" — the children and descendants of the founding generation of Communist leaders.[3]

Xi Jinping's childhood was shaped profoundly by the political upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966. His father fell from political grace after being accused of using a novel to promote an "anti-party" agenda, and Xi Zhongxun was purged and persecuted.[4] The elder Xi was detained and subjected to public humiliation sessions, a traumatic period that deeply affected the family. As a teenager, Xi Jinping was sent to the countryside as part of the Down to the Countryside Movement, which relocated urban youth to rural areas for re-education through agricultural labor.

Xi was dispatched to Liangjiahe Village in Yanchuan County, Shaanxi Province, where he lived in a yaodong — a traditional cave dwelling carved into the loess hills of northwest China.[5][6] Life in Liangjiahe was austere; the young Xi performed manual labor alongside the villagers, carrying grain and digging irrigation ditches. According to accounts of this period, Xi initially struggled to adapt to the harsh rural conditions but gradually earned the respect of local residents.[5] He attempted to join the CCP multiple times and was rejected on several occasions before finally being accepted as a member in 1974.[1] After joining the party, he became the local party branch secretary in Liangjiahe, gaining his first experience in grassroots governance. This rural stint, which lasted approximately seven years, became a formative experience that Xi would later reference frequently in his political career as evidence of his connection to ordinary Chinese people.[6]

Education

Following his years in the countryside, Xi Jinping enrolled at Tsinghua University in Beijing as a worker-peasant-soldier student — a category of university enrollment established during the Cultural Revolution that prioritized students from working-class and peasant backgrounds rather than those who passed traditional entrance examinations.[1] At Tsinghua, Xi studied chemical engineering in the School of Chemical Engineering, completing his undergraduate degree.[7]

Xi later returned to Tsinghua University to pursue postgraduate studies. He earned a Doctor of Laws (LLD) degree from the university's School of Humanities and Social Sciences, completing a doctoral dissertation focused on Marxist theory and ideological education as applied to rural development.[1] His academic credentials, while sometimes scrutinized, have been a notable element of his official biography, as he remains one of the most highly educated leaders in the history of the People's Republic of China.

Career

Early Political Career

After graduating from Tsinghua University, Xi Jinping began his political career by serving as a secretary to Geng Biao, then a senior military official who served as Minister of National Defense and secretary-general of the CMC. This position gave Xi direct exposure to military affairs and high-level decision-making at a young age.[1][8]

From this position, Xi transitioned to local governance in Hebei Province, where he served as deputy secretary of Zhengding County. He subsequently became the county's party secretary. His time in Zhengding established a pattern that would characterize his career trajectory: a steady, methodical ascent through the ranks of provincial politics, building networks and demonstrating administrative competence at each level.[8]

Fujian Province

Xi Jinping spent a significant portion of his career — approximately 17 years — in Fujian Province on China's southeastern coast. He held a succession of increasingly senior positions, serving as vice mayor of Xiamen, a special economic zone, before moving on to roles as party secretary of Fuzhou, the provincial capital, and then to positions in the provincial government.[1][9]

In August 1999, Xi was appointed Governor of Fujian, a position he held until October 2002.[1] Fujian's geographic proximity to Taiwan meant that Xi developed familiarity with cross-strait relations and Taiwan affairs during this period. He oversaw economic development initiatives aimed at attracting investment from Taiwanese businesses and strengthening trade links across the Taiwan Strait.[9] His tenure in Fujian also coincided with China's broader economic opening and the rapid development of the country's coastal provinces.

Zhejiang Province

In late 2002, Xi was transferred to Zhejiang Province, one of China's wealthiest and most economically dynamic regions. He initially served as acting governor from October 2002 before being appointed party secretary of Zhejiang in December 2002, making him the top political official in the province.[10] He held the party secretary post until March 2007.

Zhejiang's economy was driven largely by a vibrant private sector and a strong entrepreneurial culture, particularly centered around the city of Wenzhou and the broader Yangtze River Delta region. As party secretary, Xi managed an economy characterized by small and medium-sized private enterprises, export-oriented manufacturing, and rapid urbanization.[10] His experience in Zhejiang exposed him to a model of economic growth distinct from the state-led development prominent in other parts of China, and he developed relationships with entrepreneurs and business leaders that would later influence his policy perspectives.[1]

During his tenure, Zhejiang maintained high economic growth rates, and Xi earned a reputation as an effective administrator. He wrote a regular column under the pen name "Zhe Xin" in a local party newspaper, offering commentary on governance, economic development, and social issues.[10]

Shanghai and Rise to the Politburo Standing Committee

In March 2007, following the dismissal of Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu on corruption charges, Xi was transferred to Shanghai to serve as acting party secretary.[11] His tenure in Shanghai was brief — lasting approximately seven months — but it was a significant stepping stone. Shanghai, as one of China's most important economic and financial centers, was a high-profile post that signaled Xi's rising stature within the CCP hierarchy.

In October 2007, at the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi was elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee, the apex of CCP power. He was also named the first-ranking member of the Central Secretariat.[1] His rapid promotion from a provincial posting to the PSC surprised some observers, as other candidates had been considered more likely contenders.[12]

In March 2008, Xi was appointed Vice President of the People's Republic of China, succeeding Zeng Qinghong. He served in this role until March 2013. During this period, he was widely understood to be the designated successor to Hu Jintao as the next paramount leader of China.[1] He was also appointed vice chairman of the CMC in 2010, further consolidating his position as heir apparent to the top leadership.

General Secretary and President

On 15 November 2012, Xi Jinping was elected General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party at the First Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, succeeding Hu Jintao. He simultaneously assumed the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission. On 14 March 2013, he was elected President of the People's Republic of China by the National People's Congress, completing his assumption of the three most powerful offices in the Chinese political system.[1]

Upon taking office, Xi launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that became one of the defining features of his leadership. The campaign targeted officials at all levels of the party and state apparatus, including senior military officers and members of the Politburo Standing Committee. Among the most prominent figures brought down was Zhou Yongkang, a former PSC member and security chief, whose prosecution broke an informal convention that PSC members were immune from criminal investigation after retirement.[1][13] The campaign was described by Xi's administration as essential for maintaining the party's legitimacy and public trust, while critics characterized it as partly a tool for consolidating political power.

In October 2016, the CCP's Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee officially designated Xi as the "core" of the party leadership, a title that had not been conferred on his predecessor Hu Jintao and which carried significant symbolic weight, recalling the designations given to Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin.[2]

Domestic Policy

Xi's domestic agenda has encompassed broad economic, social, and governance reforms. He has promoted the concept of "common prosperity," a framework aimed at reducing income inequality and expanding the middle class. Under this banner, the government pursued targeted poverty alleviation programs, with official statistics claiming the elimination of extreme poverty in China by the end of 2020.[13]

In 2021, Xi directed a broad regulatory crackdown that affected multiple sectors of the Chinese economy, including technology companies, the private tutoring industry, and the property sector. Major technology firms faced increased antitrust scrutiny and regulatory constraints, while the private education sector was subjected to rules effectively converting for-profit tutoring companies into nonprofit entities. These moves reflected Xi's stated goal of reducing economic inequality and excessive capital accumulation in certain industries.[13]

Xi has expanded the role of state-owned enterprises in the Chinese economy, emphasizing their importance in strategic sectors. He has championed advanced manufacturing and technological development, including initiatives related to artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and other high-technology fields. His concept of "military-civil fusion" seeks to integrate civilian technological innovation with military modernization.[1]

The COVID-19 pandemic posed a major governance challenge during Xi's leadership. From January 2020 to December 2022, China pursued a strict zero-COVID policy characterized by mass testing, quarantine requirements, and localized lockdowns. The policy was ultimately abandoned in December 2022, following widespread protests in multiple Chinese cities — a rare occurrence of public dissent in China under Xi's leadership.[13]

Foreign Policy

Xi Jinping has pursued an assertive foreign policy that has reshaped China's international posture. He has championed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure and development program launched in 2013 that has financed projects across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The BRI became a signature element of Xi's foreign policy, though it has faced criticism regarding debt sustainability and transparency.[14]

Relations between China and the United States have been a central focus of Xi's foreign policy. Under Xi's leadership, the bilateral relationship has been marked by tensions over trade, technology, Taiwan, and strategic competition. In 2026, the prospect of a summit between Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump continued to draw international attention, with tariffs and Taiwan remaining key points of contention.[15] The U.S.-China relationship has been characterized by disputes over semiconductor export controls, rare earth minerals, and broader economic decoupling.[16]

Xi has taken a hardline stance on territorial disputes, including China's claims in the South China Sea based on the nine-dash line, the Sino-Indian border dispute, and cross-strait relations with Taiwan. He has presided over a significant military buildup and modernization of the People's Liberation Army.[17]

In Europe, leaders have sought to navigate complex relationships with Beijing. In February 2026, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz traveled to China seeking a "balanced, reliable, regulated and fair" partnership with Xi, reflecting the European balancing act between economic engagement with China and alignment with the United States.[18][19]

Xi has also faced scrutiny for China's relationship with Russia, particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Efforts by European and Western governments to pressure Beijing over its support for Moscow have met limited success, highlighting deep economic interdependencies and divergent strategic interests.[20]

Military Purges

Since mid-2023, Xi has conducted a series of purges within the senior ranks of the People's Liberation Army, removing dozens of officers. The purges affected senior figures across multiple branches of the military, including individuals who had held positions in the CMC and the PLA's nuclear force, the PLA Rocket Force. As of early 2026, additional purges continued, with two senior officers removed in January 2026. Analysts have debated whether these purges — while intended to root out corruption and ensure loyalty — could create instability within the military command structure.[21]

Personal Life

Xi Jinping was first married to Ke Lingling, the daughter of a Chinese diplomat, in 1979. The marriage ended in divorce in 1982.[1] In 1987, Xi married Peng Liyuan, a prominent folk singer and performing artist who had achieved national fame through appearances on the CCTV New Year's Gala. Peng held the rank of major general in the PLA and was one of the most recognized entertainers in China prior to Xi's ascent to national leadership.[22]

The couple has one daughter, Xi Mingze, who was born in 1992. Xi Mingze reportedly studied at Harvard University under a pseudonym, maintaining a low public profile.[3]

Xi resides in the Zhongnanhai leadership compound in central Beijing, the traditional seat of the CCP and Chinese government leadership. He has described his years in Liangjiahe as formative, and has cultivated a public image that emphasizes his connection to rural China and the hardships of his youth during the Cultural Revolution.[5][6]

Recognition

Xi Jinping received the official designation of "leadership core" (领导核心) from the CCP in 2016, a title that placed him in the same category as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin — the three previous leaders to have been given the distinction. This designation was not conferred upon his immediate predecessor Hu Jintao, and its bestowal was interpreted as a significant consolidation of Xi's authority within the party.[2]

In 2018, the National People's Congress approved a constitutional amendment removing the two-term limit on the presidency, enabling Xi to potentially serve as president indefinitely. This move, combined with his consolidation of party, state, and military authority, made Xi the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, according to multiple analysts and international observers.[13]

Xi's political ideology, known as "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," was enshrined in the CCP constitution in 2017 and later into the state constitution. This made Xi only the third leader, after Mao and Deng, to have a named ideological contribution written into the party charter while still in office.[1]

References

  1. 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 "Xi Jinping Profile".Brookings Institution.2018-03.https://web.archive.org/web/20210927053240/https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/china_20180318_xi_jinping_profile.pdf.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 "Connecting the dots of the Hong Kong law and veneration of Xi".Nikkei Asia.https://web.archive.org/web/20211203074351/https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Beijing-Diary/Connecting-the-dots-of-the-Hong-Kong-law-and-veneration-of-Xi.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 "Born Red".The New Yorker.2015-04-06.https://web.archive.org/web/20191004153259/https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
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  5. 5.0 5.1 5.2 "For China's Rising Leader, A Cave Was Once Home".NPR.2012-11-09.https://web.archive.org/web/20180616053635/https://www.npr.org/2012/11/09/164684418/for-chinas-rising-leader-a-cave-was-once-home.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  6. 6.0 6.1 6.2 "Xi Jinping and his village".CNN.2018-03-19.https://web.archive.org/web/20210226054335/https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi-jinping-village-intl/index.html.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
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  8. 8.0 8.1 "Aiming for Top, Xi Jinping Forged Ties Early in China".The New York Times.2012-09-30.https://web.archive.org/web/20120930091232/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/world/asia/aiming-for-top-xi-jinping-forged-ties-early-in-china.html.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  9. 9.0 9.1 "From Fujian, China's Xi Offers Economic Olive Branch to Taiwan".The Diplomat.2014-11.https://web.archive.org/web/20160610145941/https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/from-fujian-chinas-xi-offers-economic-olive-branch-to-taiwan/.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  10. 10.0 10.1 10.2 "China's leadership transition: Xi Jinping's time in Zhejiang".South China Morning Post.https://web.archive.org/web/20160429160349/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1068825/chinas-leadership-transition-xi-jinpings-time-zhejiang.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  11. "Xi Jinping appointed Shanghai Party Secretary".Sohu.2007-03-24.https://web.archive.org/web/20071016061557/http://news.sohu.com/20070324/n248946143.shtml.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
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  13. 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 "Xi Jinping: Globalist, Autocrat, Misread".The Wall Street Journal.https://web.archive.org/web/20201224233237/https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-globalist-autocrat-misread-11608735769.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  14. "Opinion | China tried to buy the world. It failed.".The Washington Post.2026-02-23.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/02/23/china-belt-and-road-power/.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
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  20. "As Ukraine War Enters Fifth Year, Europe Faces Hard Truth On China".Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.2026-02-22.https://www.rferl.org/a/china-ukraine-russia-sanctions-peace-deal-putin-xi-zelenskyy/33682608.html.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
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