Rufus Wheeler Peckham

Rufus Wheeler Peckham
Born	Rufus Wheeler Peckham Jr. 8 11, 1838
Birthplace	Albany, New York, U.S.
Died	Template:Death date and age Altamont, New York, U.S.
Nationality	American
Occupation	Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Known for	Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1896–1909); authoring the majority opinion in Lochner v. New York
Education	Albany Academy; studied law privately
Spouse(s)	Harriette M. Arnold

Rufus Wheeler Peckham Jr. (November 8, 1838 – October 24, 1909) was an American jurist who served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from January 6, 1896, until his death on October 24, 1909. Born into a prominent legal family in Albany, New York, Peckham rose through the ranks of New York's legal and political establishment, serving as a trial court judge and then as a justice on the New York Court of Appeals before his appointment to the nation's highest court by President Grover Cleveland. Peckham is best remembered for authoring the majority opinion in Lochner v. New York (1905), one of the most consequential and debated decisions in American constitutional history, in which the Court struck down a New York law limiting the working hours of bakers on the grounds that it violated the liberty of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. His jurisprudence was characterized by a commitment to limited government, economic liberty, and a skepticism toward state regulatory power that defined the era often called the "Lochner era" in American constitutional law. Though his tenure on the Court lasted slightly more than thirteen years, the decisions he authored and the legal philosophy he championed continued to shape debates over the proper scope of governmental authority long after his death.

Early Life

Rufus Wheeler Peckham Jr. was born on November 8, 1838, in Albany, New York, into a family with deep roots in the legal profession and in the political life of the state. His father, Rufus Wheeler Peckham Sr. (1809–1873), was a prominent attorney and jurist who served on the New York Court of Appeals and, before that, as a member of the United States House of Representatives representing New York. His mother was Isabella Lacey Peckham. The elder Peckham's career in both law and politics provided his son with early exposure to the institutions that would define his own professional life. Rufus Wheeler Peckham Sr. died under tragic circumstances in 1873, when the steamship Ville du Havre sank in the Atlantic Ocean during a transatlantic voyage; his body was never recovered.

The Peckham family was well-established among Albany's social and professional elite. Rufus Jr. had a brother, Wheeler Hazard Peckham, who also became a distinguished attorney in New York and was himself nominated to the United States Supreme Court by President Cleveland in 1894, though his nomination was rejected by the United States Senate. The family's prominence in law and Democratic Party politics made the Peckham name one of considerable influence in nineteenth-century New York.

Growing up in Albany, Rufus Jr. was immersed in an environment shaped by legal discourse and civic engagement. The city served as the capital of New York State, and the Peckham household was regularly connected to the political and judicial circles that congregated there. This upbringing instilled in Peckham an early familiarity with the workings of government and the courts, shaping the trajectory of his future career.

Education

Peckham received his early education at the Albany Academy, a well-regarded preparatory school in his hometown that had educated a number of notable New Yorkers. He subsequently studied at the Philadelphia Classical Academy in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Unlike many of his contemporaries who would later serve on the Supreme Court, Peckham did not attend law school. Instead, following the common practice of the era, he studied law privately in his father's law office in Albany, reading law under the guidance of experienced practitioners. He was admitted to the New York bar in 1859 at the age of twenty, commencing his legal career in Albany.

Career

Early Legal and Political Career

After his admission to the bar in 1859, Peckham entered private legal practice in Albany, where he quickly established himself as a capable attorney. He became associated with the Democratic Party, which was the dominant political force in his family. His legal practice grew in prominence, and he handled a variety of civil and commercial matters that reflected the economic activity of New York's capital city.

Peckham's entry into public life came through a series of appointments and elections that reflected both his legal acumen and his political connections. In 1869, he was elected district attorney of Albany County, a position he held for three years. Service as district attorney gave Peckham experience in criminal prosecution and public administration, broadening his expertise beyond the civil practice he had conducted as a private attorney.

Following his tenure as district attorney, Peckham returned to private practice for several years before being drawn back into public service. He was active in Democratic political circles in Albany, and his reputation as a skilled lawyer and a reliable party member positioned him for further advancement within New York's judiciary.

New York Judiciary

In 1883, Peckham was elected to the New York Supreme Court, which, despite its name, serves as a trial-level court of general jurisdiction in the New York state court system. He served on the Supreme Court for several years, presiding over a range of cases and earning a reputation for careful legal reasoning and adherence to established legal principles.

Peckham's judicial career advanced further in 1886, when he was elected to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court. His father had also served on this court, making the younger Peckham's elevation a notable instance of intergenerational judicial service. On the Court of Appeals, Peckham served alongside other distinguished jurists and participated in decisions that addressed significant questions of New York law, including issues of contract, property, and the scope of state regulatory authority.

During his time on the Court of Appeals, Peckham developed a judicial philosophy that emphasized individual liberty, particularly in economic matters, and expressed skepticism toward expansive exercises of the state's police power. His opinions on the Court of Appeals foreshadowed the approach he would later take on the United States Supreme Court. In particular, his opinion in People v. Budd (1889), a dissent in a case involving state regulation of grain elevators, articulated a robust defense of economic liberty and a narrow interpretation of the state's power to regulate private business. This dissent attracted attention beyond New York and helped establish Peckham's reputation as a jurist committed to limited government and the protection of property rights.

Nomination and Confirmation to the Supreme Court

In 1894, President Grover Cleveland first attempted to place a Peckham on the Supreme Court by nominating Rufus's brother, Wheeler Hazard Peckham. However, the nomination was defeated in the Senate, largely due to the opposition of David B. Hill, a powerful New York senator and political rival of the Cleveland faction of the Democratic Party. Hill invoked senatorial courtesy to block the nomination.

Following the failed nomination of Wheeler Hazard Peckham, President Cleveland turned to Rufus Wheeler Peckham Jr. as his next nominee for the Supreme Court seat. Cleveland nominated Peckham on December 3, 1895. Unlike his brother's contentious nomination, Rufus Peckham's nomination encountered comparatively little opposition. Senator Hill, who had torpedoed Wheeler Peckham's nomination, did not oppose Rufus, reportedly because the two men had a more amicable personal relationship. The Senate confirmed Peckham by voice vote on December 9, 1895, and he received his commission on January 6, 1896. At the age of fifty-seven, Peckham took his seat as the fifty-eighth Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Tenure

Peckham served on the Supreme Court for over thirteen years, from January 1896 until his death in October 1909. His tenure coincided with a period of significant economic and social transformation in the United States, as the country grappled with industrialization, the growth of corporate power, and increasing demands for government regulation of economic activity. Peckham's jurisprudence during this period was marked by a consistent commitment to the protection of individual economic liberty and a correspondingly narrow view of the power of state and federal governments to regulate business and labor.

Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897)

One of Peckham's earliest and most significant opinions for the Court came in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897). In this case, the Court struck down a Louisiana statute that prohibited its citizens from obtaining marine insurance from out-of-state companies that had not complied with Louisiana law. Writing for a unanimous Court, Peckham held that the statute violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with the liberty of contract. The Allgeyer decision was notable for being the first time the Supreme Court explicitly recognized "liberty of contract" as a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. This doctrine would become a cornerstone of the Court's jurisprudence during the Lochner era and would serve as the foundation for Peckham's most famous opinion.

Lochner v. New York (1905)

Peckham's most consequential opinion was his majority decision in Lochner v. New York (1905), a case that has become one of the most analyzed and debated in American constitutional law. The case involved a challenge to a New York statute, the Bakeshop Act, which limited the number of hours that bakery employees could work to ten hours per day and sixty hours per week. Joseph Lochner, a bakery owner in Utica, New York, was fined for allowing an employee to work more than the permitted hours and challenged the statute as unconstitutional.

Writing for a five-to-four majority, Peckham struck down the Bakeshop Act as a violation of the liberty of contract protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Peckham reasoned that the right to purchase or sell labor was part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the state could only interfere with this right through a legitimate exercise of its police power—that is, legislation that genuinely served the public health, safety, or welfare. Peckham concluded that the Bakeshop Act was not a legitimate health regulation but rather an impermissible interference with the freedom of bakers and their employers to enter into contracts regarding working hours. He wrote that the statute was "an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate."

The Lochner decision provoked immediate and lasting controversy. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. authored a celebrated dissent in which he accused the majority of deciding the case based on an economic theory—specifically, laissez-faire capitalism—rather than on the Constitution. Holmes's famous statement that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics" became one of the most quoted lines in American legal history. Justice John Marshall Harlan also dissented, arguing that the New York legislature had a reasonable basis for concluding that limiting bakers' working hours served a legitimate public health purpose.

The Lochner decision gave its name to the "Lochner era," a period extending roughly from the late 1890s to 1937 during which the Supreme Court frequently struck down state and federal economic regulations on the basis of liberty of contract. The era ended with the Court's decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), which effectively repudiated the Lochner framework. In subsequent decades, Lochner was widely criticized by legal scholars and jurists as an example of judicial overreach and the imposition of the justices' own economic preferences on the legislative process. However, in more recent years, some scholars have offered more nuanced assessments, arguing that the decision reflected genuine concerns about governmental power and individual liberty that remain relevant to contemporary constitutional debates.

Antitrust Jurisprudence

In addition to his liberty-of-contract opinions, Peckham authored important decisions in the field of antitrust law. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (1897), he wrote the majority opinion holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibited all contracts and combinations in restraint of trade, not merely those deemed "unreasonable." This strict interpretation of the Sherman Act expanded the reach of federal antitrust enforcement and was a significant development in the law governing competition. Peckham's opinion in United States v. Joint Traffic Association (1898) reinforced this approach.

Peckham's antitrust jurisprudence presented an interesting contrast with his liberty-of-contract decisions. While he was skeptical of state regulatory power over individual labor contracts, he was willing to support federal action against combinations of businesses that restrained trade. This apparent tension reflected the complexity of the era's legal debates over the proper role of government in economic life.

Other Notable Opinions

Peckham authored a number of other significant opinions during his tenure. In Ex parte Young (1908), he wrote the majority opinion establishing the doctrine that federal courts could issue injunctions against state officials to prevent the enforcement of unconstitutional state laws, even when the state itself was protected by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The Ex parte Young doctrine became a foundational principle of federal jurisdiction and remains a critical mechanism for the enforcement of constitutional rights against state action.

Judicial Philosophy

Peckham's judicial philosophy was rooted in a commitment to what he understood as the constitutional protection of individual liberty, particularly in the economic sphere. He was influenced by the classical liberal tradition that emphasized limited government and the sanctity of private contracts. Peckham viewed the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a substantive limitation on governmental power, not merely a procedural guarantee, and he was willing to use judicial review to strike down legislation that he believed exceeded the legitimate scope of the state's police power.

At the same time, Peckham was not uniformly opposed to all government regulation. His antitrust opinions demonstrated a willingness to enforce federal laws against monopolistic combinations, and he joined the majority in cases that upheld certain exercises of regulatory authority. His jurisprudence was thus more nuanced than the caricature sometimes drawn by critics who portray the Lochner era as one of blanket judicial hostility to all forms of economic regulation.

Personal Life

Rufus Wheeler Peckham married Harriette M. Arnold in 1866. The couple had two sons. Peckham maintained his primary residence in Albany, New York, throughout much of his life, though he spent considerable time in Washington, D.C., during his years on the Supreme Court. He was known among his contemporaries as a dignified and reserved figure who preferred the company of a small circle of close friends and colleagues.

Peckham was a member of the Fort Orange Club in Albany and was involved in the social life of the city's professional elite. He was also known to enjoy outdoor pursuits, including hunting and fishing, which he pursued during the Court's summer recesses.

In his later years, Peckham's health declined. He suffered from a series of ailments that increasingly limited his ability to participate fully in the work of the Court. He died on October 24, 1909, at his country home near Altamont, New York, at the age of seventy. He was buried in Albany Rural Cemetery.

Recognition

Peckham's service on the Supreme Court placed him among the most influential jurists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His authorship of the majority opinions in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, Lochner v. New York, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, and Ex parte Young ensured that his name would be associated with several of the defining legal doctrines of his era.

While Lochner was long regarded as a cautionary example of judicial activism, scholarly reassessments in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries brought renewed attention to Peckham's constitutional philosophy and its relevance to ongoing debates about the relationship between individual rights and governmental power. Legal historians have examined his career as part of a broader study of the intellectual and political currents that shaped American law during the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era.

Legacy

Rufus Wheeler Peckham's legacy in American law is indissoluble from the Lochner decision and the era it defined. For much of the twentieth century, Lochner served as a negative example in constitutional law, cited as a case in which the Supreme Court improperly substituted its own economic views for those of democratically elected legislatures. The term "Lochnerism" entered the legal lexicon as a pejorative denoting judicial decisions perceived as grounded in ideology rather than constitutional text or precedent.

However, the legacy of Lochner and Peckham's broader jurisprudence has been subject to ongoing reappraisal. Some legal scholars, particularly those associated with libertarian constitutional thought, have argued that the Lochner-era Court was correct to protect economic liberty as a fundamental right and that the subsequent abandonment of this protection left individuals vulnerable to overreaching government regulation. Others have pointed to the Ex parte Young doctrine as one of Peckham's most enduring and constructive contributions to American law, one that continues to serve as a vital tool for enforcing constitutional rights in federal courts.

The Peckham family's contribution to American law and politics—spanning two generations of jurists and including service on the New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court—represents a notable chapter in the history of the American legal profession. Rufus Wheeler Peckham Jr.'s career illustrates the intersection of family tradition, political connection, and legal philosophy that characterized the American judiciary during a formative period in the nation's constitutional development.