Eric Maskin

Eric Maskin
Born	Eric Stark Maskin 12 12, 1950
Birthplace	New York City, U.S.
Nationality	American
Occupation	Economist, mathematician
Title	Adams University Professor and Professor of Economics and Mathematics
Employer	Harvard University
Known for	Mechanism design theory
Education	Harvard University (BA, MA, PhD)
Awards	Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (2007)

Eric Stark Maskin (born December 12, 1950) is an American economist and mathematician who has made foundational contributions to the field of mechanism design theory, a branch of economics and game theory concerned with designing institutions and rules that achieve desired social or economic outcomes even when participants act in their own self-interest. For this work, Maskin was jointly awarded the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences alongside Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson, with the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences citing the three scholars "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory." Maskin currently holds the position of Adams University Professor and Professor of Economics and Mathematics at Harvard University, where he has been a leading figure in economic theory for decades. His academic career has spanned appointments at some of the most prestigious institutions in the world, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Cambridge, Princeton University, and the Institute for Advanced Study. Beyond mechanism design, Maskin has contributed to social choice theory, game theory, contract theory, and the study of globalization and inequality, establishing himself as one of the most influential economic theorists of his generation.

Early Life

Eric Stark Maskin was born on December 12, 1950, in New York City, United States. He grew up in Alpine, New Jersey, a small borough in Bergen County. Maskin attended Tenafly High School in the neighboring community of Tenafly, New Jersey, where he demonstrated early aptitude in mathematics and the sciences. His formative years in the New York metropolitan area placed him in proximity to a rich intellectual environment, and he developed an interest in mathematics that would later shape the trajectory of his academic career.

Details about Maskin's family background and childhood remain largely private, consistent with his generally reserved public persona. What is known is that his early educational experiences laid the groundwork for his pursuit of rigorous mathematical and economic inquiry at the university level. His path from the public schools of northern New Jersey to Harvard University reflected both strong academic preparation and an intellectual curiosity that extended across disciplinary boundaries, particularly the intersection of mathematics and social science.

Education

Maskin attended Harvard University for his entire higher education, earning his Bachelor of Arts degree, followed by a Master of Arts degree, and ultimately his Doctor of Philosophy degree, all from Harvard. His doctoral dissertation, titled "Social Choice on Restricted Domains," was completed in 1976 and explored fundamental questions about how societies aggregate individual preferences into collective decisions — a theme that would remain central to his scholarly work throughout his career.

Maskin's doctoral advisor was Kenneth Arrow, the legendary economist and Nobel laureate who had himself revolutionized social choice theory with his impossibility theorem. Studying under Arrow provided Maskin with a deep grounding in the mathematical foundations of economic theory and an appreciation for the power of rigorous formal analysis to illuminate questions about social welfare and institutional design. The intellectual lineage from Arrow to Maskin represents one of the most consequential advisor-student relationships in the history of modern economics, as Maskin would go on to extend and deepen the theoretical framework that Arrow had helped to establish.

Career

Early Academic Career at MIT and Cambridge

After completing his PhD at Harvard in 1976, Maskin joined the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he served as a professor of economics. During his years at MIT, Maskin produced some of his most important and influential research, including seminal papers on mechanism design theory and implementation theory that would later form part of the basis for his Nobel Prize. MIT's economics department during this period was a hub of theoretical innovation, and Maskin's presence there contributed to its reputation as one of the leading centers for economic theory in the world.

Maskin also held an appointment at the University of Cambridge in England, further expanding his international academic connections and exposing his work to a broader community of scholars in economics and mathematics.

Mechanism Design Theory

The work for which Maskin is best known — and for which he shared the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize — is his contribution to mechanism design theory. Mechanism design can be understood as the "reverse engineering" of economics: rather than analyzing existing markets and institutions, the theory asks how institutions can be designed to achieve particular goals, given that participants have private information and act in their own interest.

The field was originally conceived by Leonid Hurwicz in the 1960s and 1970s. Maskin's contribution was to develop the theory further, particularly through his work on implementation theory. His landmark 1977 paper (later published in revised form) on "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality" established conditions under which a social choice rule can be implemented by a mechanism in Nash equilibrium. This result, which became known as "Maskin monotonicity," provided a necessary condition for Nash implementation and became one of the foundational results in the field. The concept clarified when and how it is possible to design rules — such as auction formats, voting procedures, or regulatory schemes — that lead to socially desirable outcomes even when individuals have incentives to misrepresent their preferences or information.

The Nobel committee recognized the trio of Hurwicz, Maskin, and Myerson for initiating and developing this theory, which has had broad applications across economics, political science, and public policy. The theory underpins the design of auctions (including spectrum auctions for telecommunications licenses), regulation of utilities, public goods provision, and many other institutional settings where incentive compatibility is a concern.

Institute for Advanced Study and Princeton

In 2000, Maskin moved from MIT to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, where he was appointed the Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science. The Institute for Advanced Study, one of the foremost research institutions in the world, provided Maskin with an environment dedicated entirely to scholarly research, free from the teaching obligations that characterize most university appointments.

During his time at the Institute, Maskin also served as a visiting lecturer with the rank of professor at Princeton University, where he taught courses and mentored students in the Department of Economics. This dual appointment allowed him to maintain an active role in graduate education while pursuing his research agenda at the Institute.

It was during his tenure at the Institute for Advanced Study that Maskin received the Nobel Prize in 2007. The announcement brought renewed attention to the practical importance of mechanism design theory, and Maskin became a prominent public voice explaining how theoretical economics could inform the design of real-world institutions and policies.

Maskin remained at the Institute for Advanced Study until 2011, when he returned to Harvard University.

Return to Harvard

In 2011, Maskin returned to Harvard University, where he was appointed the Adams University Professor and Professor of Economics and Mathematics — one of the highest honors the university bestows on its faculty. At Harvard, he has continued his research in economic theory while also engaging in teaching and mentorship of graduate students.

Maskin's research at Harvard has extended beyond mechanism design to encompass a range of topics in economic theory and public policy. His work with Michael Kremer on globalization and inequality has attracted particular attention. In a study discussed in 2015, Maskin and Kremer developed a framework to explain how globalization interacts with inequality. Their analysis identified four groups of workers — high- and low-skilled in both developed and developing countries — and examined how international economic integration affects the relative fortunes of each group. This research addressed one of the most pressing debates in contemporary economics: whether and how the benefits of global trade are distributed across different segments of the workforce.

Voting Theory and Social Choice

Throughout his career, Maskin has maintained a deep interest in social choice theory and voting systems, topics that connect directly to his doctoral dissertation under Kenneth Arrow. He has argued that alternative voting methods — particularly the Borda count and other ranked systems — may produce more socially desirable outcomes than plurality voting, which is used in most elections in the United States and other countries.

In a paper published in the Journal of Political Economy, Maskin examined the relationship between the Borda rule and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition. In this work, Maskin argued that Arrow's IIA condition "is unjustifiably stringent because it rules out making a social welfare function" sensitive to information that may be relevant to ranking alternatives. This contribution represents an ongoing effort to refine the foundational results of social choice theory and to identify voting rules that better satisfy desirable normative criteria.

Maskin has actively participated in public discussions about voting reform and electoral systems. In October 2025, he attended and participated in a conference at Wellesley College titled "Social Choice: Theory and..." which brought together researchers, democracy advocates, and students to discuss the relationship between mathematics and democratic governance. He also participated in a public event at the London School of Economics in October 2025 titled "Voter Education: The Challenge of the Century," alongside fellow Nobel laureate Amartya Sen and other scholars.

Maskin has also given a conference on improving French and American presidential elections at HEC Paris, where he discussed the application of mechanism design and social choice theory to the design of electoral systems.

Views on Markets and Public Policy

In a 2024 interview with the Harvard Kennedy School, Maskin discussed his views on the role of markets in achieving social goals. He stated that "markets, however powerful they may be, do not always work as externalities that get in the way of social goals," highlighting the importance of institutional design in correcting market failures. This perspective is consistent with his broader body of work, which emphasizes that well-designed mechanisms and institutions can harness individual incentives to promote collective welfare in situations where unfettered markets fall short.

Maskin has also engaged with questions of egalitarianism and personal responsibility. In a contribution to the Boston Review, he responded to political philosopher John Roemer's effort to define egalitarianism in a way that incorporates a role for personal responsibility, stating that he "applaud[s] John Roemer's effort to defend egalitarianism and to define it in a way that incorporates a role for personal responsibility."

Personal Life

Maskin has generally maintained a private personal life, and relatively few details about his family and personal affairs are part of the public record. He has resided in the Cambridge, Massachusetts, area for much of his career, consistent with his long association with Harvard University and the broader Boston academic community.

In December 2023, Maskin was among the Harvard faculty members who signed a letter in support of Harvard President Claudine Gay after she faced criticism for her congressional testimony regarding antisemitism on campus. In an interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Maskin stated that "there's not much antisemitism at Harvard," defending the university's climate while acknowledging the broader concerns raised by the controversy. Maskin identified himself as Jewish in the context of this interview.

In 2025, amid the ongoing conflict between the Trump administration and Harvard University, Maskin was among the faculty members at the institution navigating the tensions between the university and the federal government over funding and institutional autonomy.

Recognition

Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences

The most significant recognition of Maskin's career came on October 15, 2007, when the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences announced that he would share the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory." Maskin delivered his Nobel lecture, which was recorded and made publicly available by the Nobel Foundation.

At the time of the Nobel announcement, Maskin was serving at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and as a visiting lecturer at Princeton University. The Daily Princetonian reported on the prize, noting the connection of both Maskin and co-laureate Myerson to the Princeton academic community.

Honorary Doctorates and Other Honors

Maskin has received honorary doctorates from multiple universities around the world. Among these is an honorary doctorate from the University of Cambodia, conferred between 2004 and 2014, reflecting the international recognition of his contributions to economic theory.

His appointment as the Adams University Professor at Harvard — a university professorship, which is the highest academic title at the university — represents a further mark of distinction within the academic world.

Maskin has also been recognized by international academic communities, including participation in research schools and events at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Legacy

Eric Maskin's contributions to mechanism design theory have had a lasting impact on both economic theory and practical institutional design. The concept of Maskin monotonicity — the necessary condition he identified for Nash implementation — has become a standard tool in the economic theorist's toolkit and is taught in graduate economics programs worldwide. His work, along with that of Hurwicz and Myerson, transformed mechanism design from an abstract theoretical curiosity into a practical framework used to design auctions, regulatory systems, voting rules, and other institutions.

The influence of Maskin's research extends well beyond the narrow confines of economic theory. His work on implementation theory has informed the design of spectrum auctions used by governments to allocate telecommunications licenses, the structuring of procurement contracts, and the development of matching algorithms used in school choice and organ donation programs. These practical applications demonstrate the real-world significance of the theoretical foundations that Maskin helped to establish.

As an educator and mentor, Maskin has trained multiple generations of economists at MIT, Princeton, and Harvard. Many of his former students and collaborators have gone on to hold prominent positions in academia, government, and international organizations. His intellectual lineage — extending from his own advisor Kenneth Arrow through to his students — represents a continuous thread in the development of modern economic theory.

Maskin's ongoing engagement with questions of voting reform and democratic governance illustrates the breadth of his intellectual interests and his commitment to using rigorous economic analysis to address questions of fundamental importance to society. His participation in conferences and public events on these topics, including appearances alongside other Nobel laureates such as Amartya Sen, reflects his continued influence in shaping public discourse about the design of democratic institutions.

His body of work is indexed in major academic databases, including IDEAS/RePEc, where his research output and citation impact can be tracked.