Stephen Johnson Field

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Stephen Johnson Field
Born4 11, 1816
BirthplaceHaddam, Connecticut, U.S.
DiedTemplate:Death date and age
Washington, D.C., U.S.
NationalityAmerican
OccupationJurist
Known forAssociate Justice of the United States Supreme Court (1863–1897); Chief Justice of California (1859–1863)
EducationWilliams College (BA)

Stephen Johnson Field (November 4, 1816 – April 9, 1899) was an American jurist who served as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court from May 20, 1863, to December 1, 1897, a tenure of over thirty-four years that stood as the second longest in the Court's history at the time of his retirement.[1] Nominated by President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War to fill a newly created tenth seat on the Court, Field became one of the most consequential and prolific justices of the nineteenth century. Before his elevation to the nation's highest court, he had already established a formidable legal career in California during the Gold Rush era, serving first in the state legislature, then as an Associate Justice and subsequently the fifth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California.[2] Field's jurisprudence left a lasting imprint on American constitutional law, particularly in the areas of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the rights of corporations, and the limits of governmental regulatory power. A figure of strong convictions and considerable controversy, he twice sought the Democratic presidential nomination and was the target of an assassination attempt by a former colleague on the California bench. He died in Washington, D.C., on April 9, 1899.

Early Life

Stephen Johnson Field was born on November 4, 1816, in Haddam, Connecticut, into a family of notable intellectual and professional distinction.[3] He was one of several children in the Field family who would rise to national prominence. His older brother, David Dudley Field II, became one of the most famous lawyers and legal reformers of the nineteenth century, known for his efforts to codify American law. Another brother, Cyrus West Field, achieved international renown for financing the laying of the first transatlantic telegraph cable. A third brother, Henry Martyn Field, became a well-known Presbyterian clergyman and author.

The Field family was deeply rooted in New England's Congregationalist tradition. Stephen's father, David Dudley Field, was a Congregational minister, and the household placed a strong emphasis on education, moral discipline, and public service. Growing up in this environment, young Stephen was exposed to rigorous intellectual discourse and developed an early interest in the law and public affairs.

As a youth, Field traveled abroad, spending time in the Middle East and Europe. He accompanied his sister and her husband, who served as a missionary, to Smyrna (present-day İzmir, Turkey), where he lived for approximately two and a half years during his adolescence. This extended period abroad broadened his worldview and exposed him to cultures and systems of governance far removed from those of rural Connecticut. Upon his return to the United States, he pursued formal education with the aim of entering the legal profession.

Education

Field attended Williams College in Williamstown, Massachusetts, one of the oldest and most respected liberal arts colleges in the country.[1] He proved to be an exceptional student and graduated as valedictorian of his class in 1837. His academic performance at Williams reflected the intellectual rigor that would characterize his later legal career.

Following his graduation, Field studied law in the office of his elder brother, David Dudley Field II, in New York City. He was admitted to the New York bar and practiced law in New York for several years, working alongside his brother. This apprenticeship under one of America's foremost legal minds gave Stephen a thorough grounding in both legal theory and practice, and exposed him to the reform-minded legal philosophy that David Dudley Field championed. After approximately seven years of practice in New York, Field determined to seek his fortune in the West, drawn by the opportunities created by the California Gold Rush.

Career

Early Legal Career in California

Stephen Johnson Field arrived in California in late 1849, during the height of the Gold Rush, settling in the newly established mining town of Marysville in the Sacramento Valley.[2] The town was little more than a rough frontier settlement at the time, and the legal infrastructure of the new territory was virtually nonexistent. Field immediately immersed himself in the chaotic and often lawless environment, establishing a law practice and quickly making a name for himself as a forceful and determined advocate.

Field's ambitions extended beyond private legal practice. Within days of his arrival in Marysville, he became involved in local governance. He was elected alcalde—a position combining the roles of mayor and local judge under the old Mexican legal system still in use before California's formal admission to the Union. In this capacity, Field adjudicated disputes, established local ordinances, and helped bring a measure of legal order to the frontier community. His tenure as alcalde was marked by sharp conflicts with other local figures, including a rival judge, and Field demonstrated the combative temperament that would characterize his entire career.

California State Legislature

In 1850, California was admitted to the Union, and Field entered the political arena. He was elected to the California State Assembly from the 14th district, serving from 1851 to 1852.[3] During his single term in the legislature, Field played an important role in shaping California's early legal framework. He was instrumental in drafting civil and criminal practice acts for the new state, drawing on the codification principles he had learned from his brother David Dudley Field II. These practice acts helped establish the procedural foundations of California's judicial system during a period of rapid growth and institutional development.

Field did not seek re-election to the legislature, instead returning to his private law practice. However, his legislative work and his reputation as a capable legal mind positioned him for higher judicial office.

California Supreme Court

In 1857, Field was appointed as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of California by Governor J. Neely Johnson, succeeding Hugh Murray on the bench.[4] He served as an associate justice from October 13, 1857, to September 12, 1859. His tenure on the California bench coincided with a turbulent period in the state's history, as the young state grappled with complex questions of land titles, mining law, and the rights of settlers versus holders of Mexican-era land grants.

In 1859, Field was elevated to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California, appointed by Governor John B. Weller. He succeeded David S. Terry, whose tenure had been marred by controversy, including Terry's involvement in a duel in which he killed United States Senator David C. Broderick.[2] As Chief Justice, Field presided over the court during a critical formative period for California law. He authored numerous opinions that helped define property rights, contract law, and governmental authority in the state. His decisions reflected a deep commitment to protecting vested property rights and limiting arbitrary governmental action—themes that would become central to his later jurisprudence on the United States Supreme Court.

Field served as Chief Justice until May 20, 1863, when he was succeeded by Warner Cope upon his appointment to the United States Supreme Court.[4]

Appointment to the United States Supreme Court

In 1863, during the Civil War, Congress expanded the Supreme Court from nine to ten justices and created a new Tenth Circuit encompassing California and Oregon. President Abraham Lincoln nominated Field to fill the new seat on March 6, 1863, and the Senate confirmed him on March 10, 1863. Field took his seat on the Court on May 20, 1863.[1]

Lincoln's selection of Field was influenced by several factors. As a Democrat who supported the Union cause, Field offered Lincoln the political advantage of bipartisan representation on the Court during wartime. Additionally, Field's extensive experience with California law and his familiarity with the legal issues of the Pacific states made him a natural choice for the new circuit. Field was also supported by California's congressional delegation, which lobbied for a westerner to fill the new seat.

Supreme Court Tenure

Field's tenure on the Supreme Court spanned more than thirty-four years, from 1863 to 1897, making it the second longest in the Court's history up to that time.[1] Over this extraordinary period, he participated in decisions that shaped the trajectory of American constitutional law through the Reconstruction era, the Gilded Age, and the beginnings of the Progressive Era.

Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence

Field became one of the most important interpreters of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868. His most famous and influential contribution came in his dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), in which the Court narrowly upheld a Louisiana law granting a monopoly on slaughterhouse operations in New Orleans. The majority opinion, written by Justice Samuel Miller, interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly, holding that it protected only the rights of national citizenship, not the broad range of civil rights retained by state citizens.

Field dissented vigorously, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment protected fundamental economic rights, including the right to pursue a lawful occupation free from arbitrary governmental interference. He contended that the Louisiana monopoly violated the butchers' right to practice their trade—a right he considered among the privileges and immunities of citizenship. Although Field's position did not command a majority in the Slaughter-House Cases, his expansive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment profoundly influenced the development of substantive due process doctrine in subsequent decades. Later courts would adopt reasoning similar to Field's in striking down economic regulations, culminating in the Lochner era of the early twentieth century.

Economic Liberty and Substantive Due Process

Throughout his tenure, Field consistently championed the protection of property rights and economic liberty against governmental regulation. He argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed substantive limitations on state legislative power, not merely procedural requirements. This view, which expanded the scope of judicial review over economic legislation, became one of the defining features of American constitutional law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Field's opinions reflected his belief that the Constitution protected individuals and corporations alike from what he viewed as confiscatory or unreasonable governmental action. He wrote or joined opinions striking down or limiting state regulatory measures in areas ranging from railroad rate regulation to taxation. His jurisprudence was particularly influential in cases involving the rights of corporations, which Field argued were entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment as "persons" under its terms.

Chinese Exclusion and Civil Rights

Field's record on civil rights and racial justice was mixed and has been the subject of considerable historical scrutiny. While he served on the circuit court in California, he authored opinions in cases involving the rights of Chinese immigrants. In some instances, he upheld the rights of Chinese residents against discriminatory state and local laws. However, Field also participated in decisions that upheld federal immigration restrictions, including the Chinese Exclusion Act. His opinions in this area reflected the complex and often contradictory attitudes of the era toward race, immigration, and national sovereignty.

Notable Opinions

Among Field's many significant opinions during his long tenure was his concurrence in Munn v. Illinois (1877) and related Granger Cases, in which the Court upheld state regulation of grain elevators and railroads. Field dissented, arguing that the regulations constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property. His dissents in these cases articulated a vision of constitutional limits on economic regulation that would gain ascendancy in later decades.

Field also wrote the majority opinion in several important cases. His body of work on the Court was vast, reflecting both the length of his service and his willingness to write separately in cases where he disagreed with the majority.

The Terry Incident

One of the most dramatic episodes in Field's career occurred in 1889, when he was the target of an attack by David S. Terry, the former Chief Justice of California whom Field had succeeded on the California bench. The conflict between Field and Terry had deep roots, stemming from legal and personal disputes dating back to the 1850s. Terry, who had a history of violent behavior—including the killing of Senator Broderick in a duel—assaulted Field in a dining room in Lathrop, California, while Field was riding circuit. Field's bodyguard, United States Deputy Marshal David Neagle, shot and killed Terry in defense of Field. The subsequent legal proceedings, including the case In re Neagle (1890), raised important constitutional questions about federal authority and the power of the executive to protect federal officers. The Supreme Court ultimately held that Neagle had acted lawfully in defending Field, establishing a significant precedent regarding federal executive power.

Presidential Aspirations

Field harbored ambitions for the presidency throughout much of his career. He sought the Democratic presidential nomination on two occasions, in 1880 and 1884, but failed to secure the party's support on either attempt. His candidacy was hampered by his position on the bench, which made active campaigning difficult and raised questions about the propriety of a sitting justice seeking elected office. Despite his failure to win the nomination, his presidential bids reflected his prominence in Democratic Party politics and his national stature as a jurist.

Retirement

By the mid-1890s, Field's health had declined significantly, and his mental faculties had begun to deteriorate. Colleagues on the Court grew concerned about his ability to participate effectively in the Court's work. According to accounts from the period, a delegation of justices reportedly encouraged Field to retire. Field finally stepped down on December 1, 1897, after thirty-four years and six months on the bench.[1] He was succeeded by Joseph McKenna, who was nominated by President William McKinley.

Field's determination to remain on the Court as long as he did was reportedly motivated in part by his desire to surpass the tenure of Chief Justice John Marshall, who had served for over thirty-four years. Field achieved this goal before his retirement.

Personal Life

Stephen Johnson Field married Sue Virginia Swearingen in 1859, during his service on the California Supreme Court. The couple did not have children. Sue Virginia Field remained a steadfast companion throughout her husband's long judicial career and their years in Washington, D.C.

Field's family connections were extensive and distinguished. In addition to his brothers David Dudley Field II, Cyrus West Field, and Henry Martyn Field, his nephew David Josiah Brewer also served on the United States Supreme Court, making them one of the few uncle-nephew pairs to serve on the nation's highest court. Another nephew, Frederick David Gray Brewer, pursued a career in law as well.

Field was known for his forceful and sometimes combative personality, both on and off the bench. He maintained strong opinions and was not averse to personal and professional conflict. His long-running feud with David S. Terry, which culminated in Terry's death, was among the most dramatic personal confrontations in American judicial history.

Field died on April 9, 1899, in Washington, D.C., at the age of eighty-two.[3] He was buried at Rock Creek Cemetery in Washington, D.C.

Recognition

Field's contributions to American law have been recognized by legal scholars and historians as among the most significant of the nineteenth century. His tenure of over thirty-four years on the Supreme Court was the longest of any justice at the time of his retirement and remained the second longest in the Court's history for many decades.[1]

The California court system has recognized Field as one of the most important figures in the state's judicial history, honoring his service as both an Associate Justice and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California.[2] His early work in shaping California's legal codes and his opinions on land, mining, and property law helped establish the legal foundations of the state during a critical period of growth.

Legal scholars have credited Field with laying the intellectual groundwork for the doctrine of substantive due process, which became a dominant feature of American constitutional law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases is studied in law schools as a foundational text in the development of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.

Field's papers and related archival materials are held in several collections, including materials accessible through the Online Archive of California.[5]

Legacy

Stephen Johnson Field's legacy in American law is substantial and multifaceted. His long service on the Supreme Court coincided with a period of profound transformation in American society, economy, and law, and his opinions both reflected and shaped the legal responses to industrialization, corporate growth, and governmental regulation.

Field's most enduring contribution to constitutional law was his articulation of substantive due process as a limitation on governmental power over economic activity. Although this doctrine fell out of favor during the New Deal era, when the Supreme Court retreated from aggressive judicial review of economic legislation, the broader principle that the Due Process Clause protects substantive rights—not merely procedural fairness—remained a vital part of American constitutional jurisprudence. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, substantive due process was invoked in contexts far removed from the economic cases that Field had championed, including cases involving personal liberty, privacy, and individual autonomy.

Field's influence on the legal treatment of corporations was also significant. His views on corporate personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment contributed to the development of a legal framework that extended constitutional protections to business entities, a development with far-reaching consequences for American economic and political life.

At the same time, Field's legacy is not without controversy. His jurisprudence has been criticized for privileging property rights over the welfare of workers and consumers, and for contributing to a legal environment that made it difficult for state and federal governments to enact progressive social and economic legislation. His record on the rights of Chinese immigrants and other marginalized groups reflected the prejudices of his era and has been subject to critical reassessment by modern scholars.

Field's career also illustrated the close relationship between law and politics in nineteenth-century America. His presidential ambitions, his political affiliations, and his willingness to engage in personal feuds revealed a figure who operated at the intersection of law and public life in ways that challenged the boundaries of judicial propriety.

Despite these complexities, Field remains a central figure in the history of the United States Supreme Court and in the development of American constitutional law. His opinions continue to be studied and debated, and his influence on the trajectory of the Fourteenth Amendment is acknowledged as one of the defining contributions of nineteenth-century jurisprudence.[3]

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 "Stephen J. Field".Oyez.https://www.oyez.org/justices/stephen_j_field/.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 "Stephen J. Field".Judicial Council of California.http://www.courts.ca.gov/12523.htm.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 "Stephen J. Field".Supreme Court Historical Society.https://web.archive.org/web/20061002223057/http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04_library/subs_volumes/04_c03_f.html.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  4. 4.0 4.1 "Supreme Court Justices of California".California Court System.https://web.archive.org/web/20180817124828/http://library.courtinfo.ca.gov/included/docs/SCJC_Vol_1.pdf.Retrieved 2026-02-24.
  5. "Stephen J. Field Papers".Online Archive of California.http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf8q2nb3dh/?query=Stephen%2520J.%2520Field.Retrieved 2026-02-24.